Will the Iranian-Russian axis succeed in annexing Sudan as well?

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect Middle East tracker’s editorial stance.  First published Haaretz , 12 March 2024

Will the Iranian-Russian axis succeed in annexing Sudan as well?

© Haim Koren 2024

With the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Sudan, Israel's partner in the Abraham Accords, renewed diplomatic relations with Iran. "Despite our reservations about the relationship with this country, for the sake of the Sudanese interest we will be ready for an alliance even with the devil"

The war that began on October 7 between Israel and Hamas did not remain limited to the Gaza Strip, and its ripples reached the entire Middle East. Hezbollah joined the campaign in the north, Iranian emissaries opened a front in Syria and Iraq, and the Hutus began to operate in Egypt's Bab al-Mandab in the south. To these can be added the diplomatic campaign in the international institutions and the legal campaign in The Hague.

One more front, which the public in Israel is less familiar and aware of, is the campaign over Sudan, another partner of Israel in the Abraham Accords. Will the axis of the United States and Israel succeed in keeping it close to it, or will the Iranian axis succeed in turning it into its ally?

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Sudan is located in the Horn of Africa, on the west bank of the Red Sea. The Nile River crosses it on its way to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. It is in an international strategic location, at a central transit point to East Africa. It has very fertile soil, with crops of cotton, grains and cattle, and was therefore considered the "Grain Granary of Africa". It is not for nothing that Saudi Arabia and the Emirates treat it as their food security reserve. What is happening in Sudan affects the entire Horn of Africa and beyond. From this, the question of control and stability in Sudan is a regional and international issue.

Stability is what Sudan has lacked for many years. The country is torn by prolonged civil wars. It consists of a political, religious and economic mosaic that breeds constant tension between borders and identities. In addition to racial (Shimim and Hamim) and religious division (Muslims, Christians, and animists), there is great variation within the ethnic groups themselves. Muslims are divided into groups claiming Arab origin and non-Arab African groups.

A clear distinction is made between the Arab-Muslim North (centered in the city of Khartoum) and the African Christians (of Hami/Black descent, some animists) located in South Sudan (now the independent state of South Sudan). Another distinction is between the Arab-Muslim North and the West (Darfur) where the majority are African-Muslims (non-Arabs). The basis of the long-standing internal conflict is racial - not religious. The Khartoum war in Darfur and the border areas expresses the core of the divisions in Sudanese society: Arabs against Africans, center against periphery and Muslims against Christians, as well as against traditional African religions in the south.

A terrorist state

In April 2019, protests and riots overthrew ruler Omar al-Bashir, after three decades of rule. Two military men - Lieutenant General Abd al-Fattah Burhan, commander of the armed forces of Sudan (the Sudanese army), and Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hamti or Hamadi), commander of the "Rapid Support Force" militia - seized power together in a military coup (the militia is also known under its former name, the Janjaweed). With the accession of Abdullah Hamdoch as Prime Minister, a triumvirate leadership called the "Provisional Sovereignty Council" was created.

The new leadership embraced Sudan's choice to continue trying to break free from its isolation and designation as a terrorist state. Sudan was designated as a terrorist state in the late 1990s, after cooperating with al-Qaeda and supporting the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak and attacks against the United States in Africa. At the end of that decade, the relationship between it and Iran also tightened, through which it transferred weapons and means of warfare to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Sudan has become a source of supply for terrorist organizations in the Middle East, Somalia and Yemen. However, her difficult situation led her to try to change direction. In 2015, it was a member of the coalition of Arab-Sunni countries that fought terrorism, supported Saudi Arabia's efforts in Yemen and cooperated against Iran. As part of this change in trend, as early as January 2016 the possibility of normalizing relations between Sudan and Israel was raised, and later that year Sudan severed its relations with Iran. In doing so, she officially joined the bloc of Arab countries that fought against the Houthis in Yemen and their Iranian supporters.

In an effort to put Sudan on the path of economic development and stability, the leadership of the Provisional Sovereignty Council chose to join the camp of the US and the West as well. This is the background to its joining the Abraham Accords - the road to Washington passed through Israel. On October 20, 2020, the US, Sudan and Israel issued a joint statement on Establishing normalization in relations between Khartoum and Jerusalem, after intensive diplomatic contacts between the two countries. The infrastructure for the agreement was laid - both Burhan and Hamti pushed for the establishment of diplomatic ties.

However, the attempts to achieve stability did not last. The agreement drawn up by the political parties, which formed the basis of the Provisional Sovereign Council and was intended to pave the way for the establishment of a civilian-democratic regime, included the integration of Hamti's militia forces into the Sudanese army. The army and the militia were unable to reach an agreement, and the avoidance of signing it deepened the tensions, to the point of the renewed outbreak of a severe and bloody conflict.

On April 15, 2023, Vice President Hamti attempted a military coup, designed to oust President Burhan and led to a bloody war between his militiamen and the Sudanese army and civilian protesters. Since October 2023, Hamti's militia forces, the incarnation of the Janjaweed forces, have been raiding Darfur again, as they raided in the early 2000s (then they murdered between 350,000 and 500,000 men, women and children in Darfur), and are once again carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocide.

One of the members of the Darfur community in Israel, Adam Muhammad Barima, who fled his country and lived here since 2008 - was murdered by Hamas in the city of Sderot in the October 7 massacre. His friends from the community said: "What Hamas did is similar to what happened in Darfur - Hamas is Janjaweed." The thousands who have been killed and the millions who have been displaced from their homes in Sudan are being added every day by refugees and displaced persons, and the fighting continues to spread across the country - sowing killing, hunger and despair.

A pact with the devil

Against the background of internal instability, regional instability and the start of the war in Gaza, the international struggle over Sudan also escalated. A few days after October 7, Sudan arrested several Hutus on its territory on their way to help Hamas in Gaza. On October 9, the president of the interim government of Sudan, Burhan, established diplomatic relations with Iran (after breaking them off in 2016).

Upon the renewal of its relations with Iran, an associate of the president said: "Sudan will be forced to cooperate with any party that is interested in supplying it with weapons, in view of the support of some countries for the Hameti forces. Now there is a great opportunity for anyone who wants to help Sudan, publicly or secretly. We expected to receive this assistance From Israel, this could have been a great opportunity for a real breakthrough, but it did not happen. Sudan was left without aid and turned to Iran, which seized the opportunity after our friend Sudan abandoned it. Despite our reservations about the relationship with this country (Iran) - for the sake of the Sudanese interest, we would be ready for an alliance even with the devil."

The main Sudanese interest, to get out of the economic crisis - to which the relationship with Israel could have contributed a lot both on the diplomatic level and in a practical sense - was caught in a new reality. In the confrontation between the two leaders, a different axis was created: President Burhan has the support of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the USA.

In Hamati, on the other hand, the Emirates support and to them are added Eritrea and Haftar's forces in Libya. Russia also supports Hamati and allows its Wagner group to assist Hamati's militia operations inside Sudan. My father-in-law, who visited Moscow on the second day of its invasion of Ukraine, transfers gold to Russia and works to allow the Russian fleet to dock at Port Sudan.

It therefore appears that the emerging axis (Iran, Russia, Qatar, Turkey, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, with Chinese bridesmaids) is succeeding in appropriating Sudan. He is also trying to harness Saudi Arabia to his ranks, and the countries on the other side, especially the US, have no real ability to neutralize the incentives he offers. These increase the Sudanese temptation to withdraw from the Israeli axis, following the war in Gaza.

Intelligence and sensitivity

At this stage of the internal war in Sudan, the power of Hamti's militia is increasing, managing to take control of additional outposts, while Burhan and the army are weakening and it seems that they are losing their grip on the country. It is worth noting that when the Sudanese army joined the fighting against the Houthis in Yemen - 90 percent of them were members of the Hamti militia. The Emirates were impressed by the militia and its command in the war in Yemen (from which they withdrew before its end, while unabashedly criticizing the way it was managed by the Saudis) and this led them to support Hamati.

The contacts between the Saudis and the Houthis - after they disrupt world trade in the Red Sea under Iran's auspices, support Hamas and attack Israel - increase the tension between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates (which, as mentioned, consistently backs up my anger) and each of them is actively pushing "its own man" in Sudan. Iran equipped Burhan's men with armed drones - and in addition there are rumors that it intervened to help Saudi Arabia against the Emirates in Sudan and sent thousands of drones to the Saudis to deliver them to Burhan and his army.

The decision on the identity of the Sudanese leader who will rule at the end of the civil war will affect the design of the policy that will be formulated. It is not clear whether Sudan-Iran relations will continue if Hamti wins the internal struggle. The nature of the US-led coalition's activity against the Houthis in the Red Sea will also affect the formation of the Sudanese outline, as well as the conduct of the Iranian axis.

Israel must continue to discreetly economize its moves vis-a-vis the actors in Sudan and plan its steps towards the "day after" taking shape in the arena while intelligently weighing the developments. It must remember that Sudan is an important player for its immediate interests, but also a complex arena where struggles between regional and international powers are taking place.

This arena gives Israel an opportunity to demonstrate its place and loyalty to various actors, within Sudan and in the region, but also challenges it, given the fact that its regional partners are on both sides of the fence on the Sudan issue. It seems that this is where Israel needs political and diplomatic wisdom and sensitivity, which have recently been absent from its toolbox.

Haim Koren is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and Reichman University, served as the first ambassador to South Sudan and as Israel's ambassador to Egypt